



## CENTER FOR PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL

### ***Ski Industry Consolidation*** *Trends, Economics, and Implications*

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*This Started with a Question*

# **What is driving the consolidation of the ski industry and what does it mean?**

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*Trends*

*Mega Passes & Consolidation*

*Implications*

# US Ski Industry

## Overview & *By the Numbers*

### *The Ski and Snowboard Resorts Industry*

is composed of companies engaged in operating downhill, cross-country, or similar skiing areas (or operating equipment, such as ski lifts and tows).

These operators often **derive income from:**

- (1) mountain operations
- (2) food and beverage
- (3) real estate
- (4) equipment rental services
- (5) ski instruction services



### *By the Numbers*

Skiers	10M
Skier Days	60M
Industry Wide Revenue	\$3.2B
# of Resorts (US)	480
Major Players	2

# Two players – Vail Resorts and Alterra Mountain Company – have come to dominate the US Ski Industry over the last five years



DATE INCORPORATED	1997	2018
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE	Public	Private Equity – KSL Partners & Crown Family
# OF RESORTS OWNED (PARTNERED)	37 (43)	15 (43)
2019 REVENUE	\$2.3B	\$680M*
OPERATING MODEL	Consistent Experience	One company, many unique brands
2018 PASSES SOLD	925K	250K

**Rapid Consolidation:**  
*In 2015 Vail owned only 11 resorts and Alterra did not exist*




\*Alterra Revenue Estimate from IBIS Worldwide

# The ski resort industry is capital intensive, which is being exacerbated by climate change – these trends are ultimately driving consolidation

- Resorts must build and maintain ski lifts, real estate, snowmobiles, and rental equipment – contributing to high capital costs (a new chairlift can cost up to \$10M)
- The western snow season has shrunk by 34 days since 1982
- Capital intensity has increased notably over the past five years – largely due to snowmaking infrastructure
- Resorts with snowmaking capabilities can attract more visitors when snowfall is poor
- Snowmaking to cover 1 acre of terrain is ~\$5K; snow making can account for up to 15% of operating expenses in total

## Snowmaking is not only costly; it makes the problem worse

*“How paradoxical. Snow-sports enthusiasts think of themselves as great lovers of nature and clean air, more conscious than most people of the changing climate. Yet their sport is becoming ever more man-made, expensive and exclusive. Perversely, it is also becoming more polluting, producing ever more emissions of greenhouse gases to survive.” – The Economist*



Economist.com

[The Economist: Winter sports face a double threat, from climate and demographic change](#)

# Capital intensity and weather variability have led to the rise of the mega pass, and in-turn consolidation

## KEY REVENUE STREAM RISK

Lift-tickets provide the foundation of ski industry economics  
But, a resort that offers only skiing is a risky business model

## HEDGING STRATEGY

- 1 Own the skier
- 2 Own the mountain

## RISE OF THE MEGA PASS




### 1 OWN THE SKIER

- 1) Pulls revenue forward:  
*Smooths cashflows, reduces weather dependence*
- 2) Better customer data leads to more sophisticated marketing  
*capture more revenue from shrinking customer base*
- 3) Fulfill Consumers Travel Aspirations:  
*Drive customers to high-margin resorts and increase customer LTV*

### 2 OWN THE MOUNTAIN

- 1) Vail has spent almost \$2B on acquisitions since 2014
- 2) Acquired marquee resorts throughout North America  
*Whistler Blackcomb, Park City Mountain Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort*
- 3) Capture all revenue once skiers are at resort  
*Average Family spends \$20K/week at Vail*


Snowfall vs. Revenue Variance




# Vail paved the way for KSL and Aspen Snowmass to form Alterra, entering the arms race of megapasses



<p><b>ALTERRA OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE</b></p>	<p>Alterra is the creation of KSL Capital Partners – renowned investors in travel and leisure. GPs led Vail Resorts IPO. KSL has raised 4 PE funds and 2 credit funds, with ~\$9B in equity commitments</p> <p>Aspen Skiing Company is the other equity owner, which is in turn owned by Henry Crown and Company</p>
<p><b>INVESTMENT THESIS</b></p>	<p>Compete in the arms race of the megapass, by rollup of geographically diverse assets</p> <p>Aggregate through pass program and drive consumer behavior up the aspirational funnel</p>



**Aspirational Funnel:** selling the potential of adventure, through always having a better experience to offer



# The Big Question: *Can the Alterra rollup justify the PE investment and achieve a successful exit?*



<b>AN IPO IS THE LOGICAL EXIT OPPORTUNITY</b>	<p>An IPO is the logical next step for Alterra – highly unlikely that private capital is attracted (e.g., selling to Blackstone) Rolling up a portfolio to compete in the arms race – selling the parts is also unlikely</p>
<b>PATH TO IPO</b>	<p>Drive growth and margin in the current assets through growing market through customer targeting, increasing market share, improving customer experience Inorganic growth opportunities are limited as ski resorts are finite: the last major resort built in the US was Beaver Creek in 1980</p>
<b>BIG QUESTION MARK</b>	<p>IPO goal would be (1) an exit event for KSL and Henry Crown &amp; Company and (2) capital infusion for operating and future investments Both climate and demographics are working against the industry: <b>is there a public market appetite for an offering in an industry experiencing secular decline?</b></p>



# Implications for Industry Future, Investors, Consumers:

*Can these two mega companies create value for investors and consumers?*

	<i>Trend</i>	<i>Issue to Resolve</i>
1	The addressable market of skiers is in decline <i>Aging of population and rise of substitute activities</i>	<i>Only 7% of new skiers stick with the sport, can resorts improve retention?</i>
2	Small independent resorts are struggling, but remain critical for building the pipeline of future customers	<i>How do resorts build a pipeline of future customers?</i>
3	Difference in approach to operating models between Vail and Alterra: Brand consistency v. portfolio of unique resorts <i>“Vail pulling the soul out of skiing”</i>	<i>Which model resonates with consumers?</i>
4	Millennials have desire to travel, but ski less than older generations	<i>Can resorts achieve success in pushing consumers up the aspirational ladder?</i>
5	Tech enables synergies in marketing, scale enables synergies in capital purchases and employee benefits	<i>Can resorts continue to find operating efficiencies?</i>


# What is driving the consolidation of the ski industry and what does it mean?

## Answer

### What happened?



**Climate change**  
*led to rise in Epic pass*



**Vail became a monopoly**  
*through Epic Pass capital and customer growth*



**Attracted Investors**  
*Alterra entered the megapass arms race*

### What might happen in the future?

#### Significant Headwinds:

- (1) *Climate change*
- (2) *Shifting demographics / shrinking customer base*



#### What to watch:

- *Diversification – Vail increased summer business by 34%*
- *Retention rate from 7% to 10-12%?*

### Key Question?

What is the exit for Alterra – is there a public market appetite?

# Appendix: Coronavirus impact on Ski Industry

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## On March 14<sup>th</sup>, a vast majority of the ski industry shut down abruptly

Roughly 50% of revenues come from lodging, food and beverage, and ski schools. How constrained will operations be in the 2020/21 season?

Vail Resorts issues \$600M bond on April 27<sup>th</sup>, received a two-year break on debt covenants.

Debt to EBITDA Ratio approaching 4x; postponed major capex projects – credit downgrade by S&P

On the positive side, one resort executive suggested that since more people can work remotely, there may be an uptick in full-time residents in ski towns

Resorts were slow to respond to the public backlash associated with closing early – Vail eventually issued partial credits for next season's passes